St. Catherine of Alexandria: Patroness of Christian Philosophers

Gregory Sadler

One might wonder: What contemporary relevance could a fourth-century saint possess, a saint whose devotion is historically attested first in the eighth or ninth century, whose life-story and whose very existence have been called into doubt by many, and whose long-celebrated feast was abolished decades ago? Does the narrative, the example, even the intercession, of St. Catherine of Alexandria still retain anything of value for contemporary Christian philosophers, both those concerned with philosophy as a rigorous discipline in its own right and those who take philosophy as a deeper intellectual calling, involving the “question of the meaning of life and immortality,” of which Pope John Paul II argued in recent years “[n]o-one can avoid. . . neither the philosopher nor the ordinary person”? (FR, 26, 27)

The answers this essay articulates, and the suggestions it offers, provide an affirmative response to these questions. If we are willing to expend the necessary intellectual effort, to undertake the sort of interpretative and imaginative engagement required, and at the same time to invoke and reach out as philosophers to our patroness, not merely as an object of study but as a living member of the community of saints, then there is much that we can glean from St. Catherine’s model and story, much that could better illuminate, deepen, revitalize, and render more fruitful our intellectual activity as Christians and as philosophers.

Regarding Catherine of Alexandria as the patron saint of Christian philosophers raises several philosophical issues, issues that go to the very heart of the question of Christian philosophy today. It raises three particularly important issues, only two of which will be fully discussed here, leaving the third one for a later paper. First, the issue must be addressed: What does it mean to speak of Catherine as a “philosopher,” or as patroness of “philosophers”? The answer to this involves something absolutely central to Christian philosophy: a heightened awareness, perhaps even recovery, of philosophy’s full sense, scope, and also its dependency, drawing upon the resources Christianity can provide. The second question is more specific: How do the moral and metaphysical realities of freedom, choice, preference and valuation, and commitment emerge within and orient the narrative of St. Catherine, and what can we learn from these? This article interweaves these two sets of issues in the reflections and resolutions provided, or rather suggested, and offered for meditation but also (if they so deserve) for criticism.

The third question poses a greater challenge: Given the scholarly doubts about the historicity of St. Catherine, are not all these interpretive meditations about St. Catherine and Christian philosophy thereby invalidated, having fixed their hopes on legends about a saint of whom we can know nothing definitively, not even if she actually existed? Does St. Catherine become at best merely the figure of an imaginative allegory, rather than a viable model and inspiritrix for Christian philosophy? These are valid concerns, not to be swept under the rug, but they can be adequately dealt with, and in addressing them further insights about St. Catherine and Christian philosophy come to light. Addressing them here and now, however, would make for a lengthier essay beyond the scope of a journal article.